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Abstract— We consider the problem of using reinforcement
learning to train adversarial agents for automatic testing and
falsification of cyberphysical systems, such as autonomous
vehicles, robots, and airplanes. In order to produce useful
agents, however, it is useful to be able to control the degree
of adversariality by specifying rules that an agent must follow.
For example, when testing an autonomous vehicle, it is useful
to find maximally antagonistic traffic participants that obey
traffic rules. We model dynamic constraints as hierarchically
ordered rules expressed in Signal Temporal Logic, and show
how these can be incorporated into an agent training process.
We prove that our agent-centric approach is able to find
all dangerous behaviors that can be found by traditional
falsification techniques while producing modular and reusable
agents. We demonstrate our approach on two case studies from
the automotive domain.
I. INTRODUCTION
When developing cyberphysical systems such as au-
tonomous vehicles, drones, or aircraft, it is important to have
a robust testing strategy that finds critical bugs before the
system is put into production. Falsification techniques exist
to find simulations in which the system under test fails to
satisfy its target specification. These falsification traces can
be generated from a bounded set of inputs. Aside from these
input bounds, it can be difficult to constrain the falsification
traces to satisfy dynamic constraints such as traffic rules on
vehicles or regulation on drones and aircraft.
For example, in the case of autonomous driving, it is useful
to have testing scenarios with agents that automatically
learn to induce the autonomous vehicle under test to make
a mistake that results in a collision or other undesirable
behavior. In this case, we are typically not interested in
the maximally adversarial vehicle, e.g. a vehicle driving
the wrong way on the freeway actively attempting to hit
everything. Instead, we seek to constrain the behavior of
the test agent depending on a desired level of difficulty of
the testing regime. We may, for example, stipulate that the
adversarial agent may not drive backwards, may not stop on
the freeway, and must obey speed limits.
To constrain the adversarial agents, we can organize the
dynamic constraints in hierarchically organized sets, called
rulebooks [4]. The hierarchy of these sets reflects the relative
importance of the rules. These rulebooks can define specific
legal requirements, e.g. do not drive the wrong way and
do not run red lights. They may also encode cultural or
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normative customary behavior such as the ‘Pittsburgh left“ or
“California Stop“. Each such dynamic constraint is modeled
as a specification in Signal Temporal Logic (STL) [8].
In addition to the dynamic constraints, the adversaries are
given a target specification. This specification is an STL
property that the vehicle under test must attempt to maintain,
and the adversaries attempt to falsify. This problem is known
as falsification. We show that our that our algorithm is
guaranteed to find bugs of the system under test when they
exist, and we demonstrate our approach on two case studies
from autonomous driving.
II. RELATED WORK
There is extensive related work in falsification of cy-
berphysical systems. Falsification considers a system and a
specification. The target specification is given in terms of the
output of the system, and the goal is to find a sequence of
inputs that induce a violation of the target specification. In
existing work on falsification using reinforcement learning
algorithms [1], in which a single, monolithic falsifier uses
reinforcement learning, but to our knowledge this is the first
work in which multiple falsification engines is packaged as
agents in the simulation, interacting with the system under
test. Also, use of STL formulas combined with reinforce-
ment learning agents allows a system designer to specify
constraints such as traffic rules.
Work in safe reinforcement [3] learning considers the
problem of training agents with dynamic constraints. How-
ever, the conventional approaches typically use a model
checker in the loop. This model checker is run at each
time step to determine which actions preserve the dynamic
constraints, and the RL agent is only allowed to choose from
those actions. In contrast, our work allows the agent to ex-
plore and naturally learn to respect the dynamic constraints.
Although the agent is not guaranteed to satisfy the dynamic
constraints, it would be straightforward to use an SMT solver
such as dReal in a counterexample-guided refinement loop
until a formal proof can be obtained.
Existing work on hierarchical rulebooks [4] describes a
model for specifications on an autonomous vehicle as sets of
rules that vary in importance, ranging from basic collision-
avoidance through traffic rules and comfort requirements to
local customs. However, our work provides an implemen-
tation of this idea as signal temporal logic constraints, and
our algorithm describes how to train an agent that behaves
adversarially within the bounds of rulebooks.
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(a) Case Study I: Driving in lane with lead vehicle. (b) Case Study II: Left vehicle merges in front.
Fig. 1: Simulation environments for case studies
III. BACKGROUND
Our goal is to test an autonomous vehicle, called an “ego”,
vehicle in simulation. The autonomous vehicle is being tested
against a specification, and the simulation contains other
agents that seek to cause the ego vehicle to falsify its
requirement. We use reinforcement learning to train agents
that behave in a constrained adversarial fashion to cause the
ego to violate its requirement. The adversarial agents are
constrained so that we are able to provide specifications, such
as traffic rules. In this way, we are able to control the level
of adversarial behavior, which enables having a spectrum of
agents that exhibit different levels of difficult behavior. The
constraints are expressed as logical scaffolds for the learning
agent, and prioritized hierarchically.
A. Reinforcement learning
Reinforcement learning provides a general framework and
class of algorithms to train goal-driven agents [12].
A reinforcement learning problem consists of a set of
states S, a set of actions A, and a set of reward values R. At
each time step t, the agent considers the current state s ∈ S
and chooses an action a ∈ A. After taking this action, it
receives a reward r.
We model the environment of the reinforcement learn-
ing problem by a conditional distribution on next states
and rewards, given the current state and the agent action,
p(s′, r|a, s). This probability distribution is called the dy-
namics of the reinforcement learning problem.
The goal of the agent is to learn a policy that maximizes
the expected reward over multiple episodes. A policy is
modeled as a conditional distribution over actions given the
current state, pi(a|s). This policy represents the probability
of taking action a at state s. For a fixed policy pi, the
state-action value function, also known as the Q function,
quantifies the agent’s belief of the quality of action a at state
s.
Many techniques exist to find the policy that maximizes
expected returns over time. In our application, however, the
precise decision-making procedure of the vehicle under test
is not known to the adversaries, and for this reason it is
not possible to compute the expectation with the explicit
probability distribution. these cases, we instead use Monte
Carlo-style techniques to sample transitions of the system,
estimate the quality of actions in a given state, and improve
the quality of the policy over time. Two such techniques that
we will use in this work are Q-learning and deep Q-learning.
We sample the initial state of each episode with a prob-
ability distribution µ(s) that is nonzero at all states. Thus,
if the algorithm runs long enough, all states will eventually
be selected as the initial state. Additionally, we will fix the
policies of the adversarial agents to be -soft. This means
that for each state s and every action a, pi(a|s) ≥ , where
 > 0 is a parameter. Taken together, random sampling of
initial states and -soft policies ensure that the agent performs
sufficient exploration and avoids converging prematurely to
local optima. In fact, it ensures that if the algorithm runs
long enough, the global optimum will eventually be found,
as all trajectories have nonzero probability.
Q-Learning: Q-learning is an algorithm used for rein-
forcement learning that does not require knowledge of the
environment that the agent is interacting with. The agent
maintains a table whose rows correspond to the states of
the system and whose columns correspond to the actions.
For a state-action pair (s, a), the entry at row s and column
a represents the quality q(s, a) that the agent has currently
calculated. The table is initialized randomly. At each time
step t, the agent considers the current state value st and, for
each state a ∈ A, uses the table to judge the quality of each
action from this state, q(st, a). Then, based on this judgment,
it selects an action at based on the -greedy policy described
above.
Next, at time step t + 1, the agent observes the reward
received rt+1 as well as the new state st+1, and it uses this
information to update its beliefs about its previous behavior
via the update equation
q(st, at)←q(st, at)+
α
[
rt+1 + γmax
a
q(st+1, a)− q(st, at)
]
where α is a learning rate parameter.
Deep Q-learning: In deep Q-learning [10], the table q(s, a)
is approximated by a neural network, q(s, a, w), where w
are the network parameters. Deep Q-learning observes states
and selects actions similarly to Q-learning, but it additionally
uses experience replay, in which the agent stores previously
observed tuples of states, actions, next states, and rewards.
At each time step, the agent updates its q-function with the
currently observed experience as well as with a batch of
experiences sampled randomly from the experience replay
buffer. The agent then updates its approximation network by
gradient descent on
(yt − q(st, at, w))2
where
yt = rt+1 + γmax
a′
q(st+1, a, w).
In the case that st is a terminal state, it is common to assume
that all transitions are such that st+1 = st and rt = 0.
B. Signal Temporal Logic
Temporal logics are powerful tools to express specifica-
tions, and enable a wide array of V&V applications, in-
cluding testcase generation, falsification, formal verification,
and runtime monitoring. Applications for these languages
include robotics [7], [13], [14], systems biology [2], and
network planning [6]. Signal Temporal Logic (STL) [9]
enables specifications real-valued signals and can be applied
to many continuous and hybrid systems, such as automotive
applications.
STL formulas are defined over predicates of the form
f(s) < c, where s is a timed trace (signal), f : Rn → R is
a function and c ∈ R. STL formulas are written using the
following grammar:
I := (a, b) | (a, b] | [a, b) | [a, b]
φ := true | f(s) < c | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | φ ∨ ψ
| EIφ | AIφ | φ UI ψ
where f(s) < c is a predicate, and the logical operators
(¬,∧,∨) have their typical meanings. In addition, E (even-
tually), A (always), U (until) and T (then) are temporal
operators. We can achieve f(s) > c by applying a negation
on f(s) < c. The temporal operators have an associated
time interval I where 0 ≤ a < b. For ease of notation, I is
dropped from the grammar when a = 0, b =∞.
STL formulas are evaluated over time series data, pack-
aged in a data structure that we call a timed trace. A timed
trace s consists of an ordered sequence of states and their
associated time, s = (x0, t0), ..., (xn, tn) where ti−1 < ti
and xi ∈ Rn. To refer to the value of the trace at a
given time, we use the notation, s(ti) = xi. We use the
notationsi = (s, ti) to refer to the tail of trace s, i.e. the trace
that contains all of the same data s from time ti onwards.
The Boolean semantics of STL formulas over a trace (s, t)
are defined recursively as follows.
(s, t) |= f(s(t)) < c ⇔ f(s(t)) < c
(s, t) |= ¬φ ⇔ ¬((s, t) |= φ)
(s, t) |= φ ∧ ψ ⇔ ((s, t) |= φ) ∧ ((s, t) |= ψ)
(s, t) |= φ ∨ ψ ⇔ ((s, t) |= φ) ∨ ((s, t) |= ψ)
(s, t) |= EIφ ⇔ ∃t′ ∈ I ⊕ t s.t. (s, t′) |= φ
(s, t) |= AIφ ⇔ ∀t′ ∈ I ⊕ t s.t. (s, t′) |= φ
(s, t) |= φ UIψ ⇔ ∃t′ ∈ I ⊕ t s.t. ((s, t′) |= ψ)∧
((s, t) |= A[0,t′]φ)
For a timed trace (s, t) starting at time t, satisfying Aφ
means φ is always true for the entire sequence. A trace
satisfies Eφ if φ is true at least once during the sequence.
The until operator states that the left formula is true until
the right formula becomes true. Since STL specifications are
defined recursively, temporal operators can be composed.
IV. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In a fixed scenario, an ego vehicle must drive while
satisfying an STL specification ψ. Several other agents
a1, . . . , an called adversaries are also in the simulation. The
adversaries seek to cause the ego to violate it specification,
while conforming their behavior to a prioritized rulebook
whose rules are expressed as STL formulas. For convenience,
we shift our perspective to the point of the view of the
adversaries, who, in falsifying ψ, must satisfy the negation
of ψ, which we call φtarget.
Formally, a scenario containing n adversarial agents has
an observable state vector s that can be decomposed into the
components
s =
[
sego s
(1)
adv . . . s
(n)
adv
]T
,
where sego is the state of the ego vehicle and s
(k)
adv is the state
of the k-th adversarial agent. In addition to the observable
state, each agent may have an unobservable state, zego for the
ego vehicle and z(k)adv for each adversarial agent. To simplify
the treatment, we describe adversarial agents without internal
state, but the addition of appropriate update equations is
straightforward.
Note that an adversarial agent is not limited to correspond
to vehicles, and can in fact control any state in the scenario,
such as a traffic light that we wish to control in a constrained
adversarial manner, such as pedestrians or traffic lights.
At each time step t, all agents simultaneously evaluate the
observable state s[t] and select an action according to their
control policies. The ego selects an action
aego[t+ 1] = fego(s[t], zego[t])
as well as a next value for its internal state
zego[t+ 1] = gego(s[t], zego[t]).
The adversarial agents select their action a(k)adv by sampling
from a probability distribution
a
(k)
adv[t+ 1] ∼ pi(k)adv(a(k)adv[t+ 1] | s[t], z(k)adv[t]).
After all agents have selected their actions, the (possibly
stochastic) simulator updates the observable state by an
unknown function s[t + 1] = fsimulator(s[t], a[t]). where
a[t] is the vector that concatenates the actions of all agents.
A. Scaffolding the learning process
Each adversarial agent k is given a target STL formula
φ
(k)
t as well as a rulebook of acceptable behavior. Each rule
in this rulebook is given as an STL formula. The rulebook for
agent k is given by ({c(k)j },), where  is the relation that
models the relative priority between constraints. If constraint
c
(k)
i has lower priority than constraint c
(k)
j , then c
(k)
i  c(k)j
and c(k)j  c
(k)
i . Similarly, if the constraints have the same
priority, then c(k)i  c(k)j and c(k)j  c(k)i . Assume that the
rules of the rulebook have been sorted into sets with the
same importance. For example, let M (k)i and I
(k)
j be two
such sets. If i < j, we say that M (k)i has less importance
than M (k)j . Then, for every c
(k)
i , c
(k)
j ∈ M (k)i , we have that
c
(k)
i  c(k)j and c(k)j  c(k)i . Similarly, for each c(k)i ∈M (k)i
and every c(k)j ∈M (k)j , we have that c(k)i  c(k)j .
For each set M (k)i , we associate a hyperparameter λ
(k)
i >
0. This is the amount of punishment that the agent will
receive for violating a constraint in M (k)i . Furthermore, there
is a hyperparameter λ(k)t > 0 that represents the reward that
agent k receives when it attains its target. If the maximum
length of an episode is fixed to be N , it is possible to give
relationships between these parameters. We want to prevent
the agent from “hacking” its rulebook, violating constraints
because the punishment is less than the reward of attaining
its target. The maximum reward that the agent could attain
by meeting its target at all N time steps is Nλ(k)t . Then, we
require that for the lowest priority group of constraints M0,
λ0 > (Nλ
(k)
t . Similarly, the higher priority groups should
have values that discourage the agent from violating those
constraints more than the lower priority rules.
To compute the reward signal, we log the state trace from
the initial time 0 to the present time. We represent this state
trace by s0:t. For an STL formula φ, let I(φ, s0:t) be the
indicator function of φ over the trace at time t. This function
is equal to 1 if (s0:t, t) |= φ (i.e. the state trace satisfies φ at
time t) and zero otherwise. Then, the reward signal can be
computed as
r(k)[t+ 1] = λ
(k)
t (1− I(φ(k)t ))
−
∑
j
|Mj |∑
i=1
λ
(k)
j I(c(k)i , s0:t) (1)
This means that the agent is rewarded by an amount λ(k)t
for causing a violation of the target specification φt, and
it is punished by an amount λ(k)j for violating a constraint
c
(k)
j ∈Mj .
Theorem 1 (Completeness): Let N be the maximum
episode length. If a satisfying trace of φ(k)t of length M < N
exists, agent k will eventually find it.
This follows as we have required that agent policies
be -soft. For simplicity, suppose that there is only one
adversarial agent. Since every action at every state is taken
with probability at least  > 0, then any N -step sequence
of actions has probability at least N > 0. Therefore, if
the algorithm runs long enough, the trace will eventually
be found.
V. CASE STUDIES
We consider two case studies. In the first, an ego vehicle
is following an adversarial agent on a single-lane freeway. In
the second scenario, the ego vehicle is driving on the freeway
and an adversarial agent performs a cut-in maneuver. In both
cases, the adversary learns to cause a collision with the ego
subject to traffic constraints automatically by exploring the
state space. Experiments were performed with the CARLA
simulator [5] on a Razer with the Intel Core i7 2.6 GHz
processor and 16GB RAM.
A. Driving in lane
In this experiment, two vehicles are driving on a single
lane freeway. The lead vehicle is an adversarial agent, and the
follow vehicle is using an adaptive cruise control policy that
we wish to test. This vehicle under test is called the “ego”
vehicle. The throttle of the ego vehicle θego is calculated by
θego =
 θmax if PD > θmaxPD if θmin ≤ PD ≤ θmax
θmin if PD < θmin
, (2)
where θmin and θmax are saturation bounds, and PD is a
proportional-derivative control law given by
PD = Kp(d− dset) +Kd(vadv − vego). (3)
Here, d is the distance between the front bumper of the two
vehicles. dset is a setpoint distance that the vehicle tries
to maintain, vego is the velocity of the ego, vadv is the
velocity of the adversary, and Kp and Kd are proportional
and derivative gains, respectively.
The objective formula for the adversarial agent is de-
scribed by the STL formula
φt = E[0,T ](d ≤ dmin) (4)
where T is the maximum duration of an episode and dmin
is the minimum safe distance between the two vehicles. In
other words, the objective of the adversary is to violate the
safety distance in time less than T .
The constraints that the adversarial agent must obey are
c1 = A(vadv ≤ vlim) (5)
c2 = A(vadv ≥ vmin), (6)
where vlim is the speed limit and vmin > 0 is a minimum
velocity to prevent the adversary from coming to a complete
stop, since stopping on the freeway is a traffic rule violation.
We set the reward parameters λt = 10 and λ1 =
λ2 = 100. The reward can be calculated as in Equation 1
depending on whether it attained its objective and whether it
violated its constraints. The safety distance is dmin = 5.02m.
The distance is computed between the two front bumpers.
This represents a car length of 5m, plus a small safety
margin. At each time step, the adversarial agent may select
an acceleration. The acceleration space has been discretized
to contain 3 possible actions. The state space consists of
d, vego, vadv , the distance and velocities of the vehicles.
1) Results using Q-table: We first consider tabular Q-
learning. Each episode is chosen from a random initial state,
and over time the adversary is able to induce a collision as
training proceeds.
Figure 4 shows two episodes from the same initial state.
In the first episode, the adversary fails to induce a collision,
whereas in the second episode it succeeds.
Figure 5 shows adversary improvement on another starting
condition. These two conditions have same initial speed but
different initial distances. We can see that the agent learns to
react with a different trajectory to cause a collision. When
initial distance large, the adversary learns to not brake too
fast. This makes the slope of the speed curve more gentle,
luring the ego into complacence and causing a collision.
Fig. 2: Initial Condition 1:
When initial distance is small, the adversary learns to
brake sooner and harder, making the slope of speed curve
more steep and causing collision.
We found that, with less strict constraints, for example for
a larger safety margin the adversarial agent trying to falsify,
the higher success rate can it get. Table I shows a glance of
training procedure for dmin = 5.5m.
Fig. 3: Initial Condition 2
Fig. 4: Quad plot for Q-table.
epoch success episode success rate (%) sim time (s)
6 76 106 71.71 9115.97
8 149 206 72.35 16963.58
24 281 371 75.76 33986.82
TABLE I: Training With Looser Constrain
Not only look at success condition, we also counting
situations of: Q1: Success not achieved, constraints violated,
Q2: Success achieved, constraints violated, Q3: No success,
no constraints violated, Q4: Success achieved, no constraint
violations, during the training. Figure 4 shows the Quad plot
for Q-table. Which we can see, with minimum speed limit,
it will either succeed or fail, but not succeed but violation
constrain or find case that have no succeed and no violation
yet shown in figure 5.
If we make the lower speed limit close to zero, the system
will catch behaviors of finding no constraint violation, no
success.
The total simulation for 488 episodes was 40623.52 sec-
onds. The average episode duration was 83.24 seconds.
2) Results using Neural Network: We then consider using
Neural Network with a replay buffer[11]. In the neural
network case, we do not need to discretize the state space.
Fig. 5: Quad plot for Q-table II
The quad plot is shown in figure 6. Performance of neural
network increase over time. The simulation time for 853
Fig. 6: Quad plot for DQN
episodes was 24806.76 seconds, with an average time of
29.08 seconds per episode.
3) Comparison between Q-table and Neural Network:
From the section above and table II we see the average run
time of the Neural Network case is less than the Q-table.
Storing and reloading Q-table across different simulations
is more computationally expensive than a portable Neural
Network. For large feasible search spaces, a fine grained Q-
table can reach 1GB of size. Note that the episode number
is different because within an epoch, a simulation exit can
happen.
Episode Success Success Rate (%) Time (s)
Q-table 233 130 55.79 17420.58
NN 237 130 54.85 6964.63
TABLE II: Comparison at end of Epoch 14
B. Lane Change Maneuvers
In this experiment, two vehicles are driving on a two-lane
freeway. The ego vehicle is controlled together by a coupled
controller consisting of cruise and collision-avoidance con-
trollers. The ego vehicle predicts future adversary positions
based on the current state and switches between the behav-
iors. The adversarial agent is on the left lane and has the goal
of merging right to cause the ego vehicle to collide with it.
To prevent cases where the adversary merges into the side
of the ego vehicle, we add a constraint that the adversary
should always be longitudinally in front of the ego car.
Controllerego =
{
Cruising if D > dsafety
Aviod Collision if D ≤ dsafety ,
(7)
The look ahead distance is calculated by:
D = dlat − vlat adversary ∗ τ (8)
where dlat is lateral distance between adversary and ego car,
vlat adversary is the current lateral velocity of the adversary,
τ is the look ahead time.
Episode Success count Success rate (%) Simulation time (s)
162 97 60.63 6797.20
192 117 61.58 7645.74
219 139 64.06 8289.18
247 157 64.08 9337.53
TABLE III: Case II
From table III we see the performance of the adversary is
improving through time. The behavior of adversary can po-
tentially help improve not only ego’s each single controller,
but also ego’s policy of switching between cruising and avoid
collision controller.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have described a technique to automatically test and
falsify complex systems by training dynamically constrained
RL agents. Our approach can find all of the counterexample
traces that a monolithic falsifier can find, and it comes with
the additional advantage of being able to re-use pretrained
adversarial agents in other testing scenarios. In future work,
we will explore the use of an SMT solver to check that
adversarial agents indeed satisfy their dynamic constraints,
and as part of a counterexample-guided retraining process
in case they do not. Furthermore, we will explore the
use of signal clustering techniques to distinguish different
categories of counterexample traces. We believe it will be
useful to test engineers to see a few categories that may
correspond to the same bug rather than to a large number of
counterexample traces.
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